Envelopes and Geometrical Covers of Side-Payment Games and their Market Representations

Philippe Artzner (1) , Claude d'Aspremont (2) , Louis-André Gérard-Varet (3)

1 Institut de Recherches Mathématiques Avancéees
2 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
3 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille

This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a given side-payment game having an empty core one may associate two different no-side payment games with the same (nonempty) core: the "envelope" and the "geometrical cover". The discrepancy is explained in terms of market games.

Domaines: Economies et finances

Philippe Artzner, Claude d'Aspremont, Louis-André Gérard-Varet. Envelopes and Geometrical Covers of Side-Payment Games and their Market Representations. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1986, 11 (1), pp.19-29. ⟨10.1287/moor.11.1.19⟩. ⟨hal-00950764⟩