ENDOGENOUS EFFORTS ON NETWORKS : DOES CENTRALITY MATTER ?

Mohamed Belhaj (1, 2) , Frédéric Deroïan (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
2 ECM - École Centrale de Marseille

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.

Mots clés: Communication Network; Endogenous Efforts; Strategic Complements

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan. ENDOGENOUS EFFORTS ON NETWORKS : DOES CENTRALITY MATTER ?. 2009. ⟨halshs-00353872⟩