How do coalitions break down? An alternative view*

Raouf Boucekkine (1, 2) , Carmen Camacho (3) , Weihua Ruan (4, 2) , Benteng Zou (5)

1 ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business
2 CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking
3 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
4 Purdue University Northwest
5 University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]

We propose an alternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coalition splitting events through unilateral countries' withdrawals, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stability criterion, and, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition will last forever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiation is very costly, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a given member

Keywords: Coalition splitting; Environmental agreements; Constitutional vs technological heterogeneity; Differential games; Multistage optimal control

Domains: Economics and Finance

Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, Weihua Ruan, Benteng Zou. How do coalitions break down? An alternative view*. 2023. ⟨hal-04287200⟩